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“For the country, it could be four years. For the court, it could be — I don’t
even want to contemplate that”
These are the words of iconic U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
asked about the presidency of Donald Trump by the New York Times in 2016. And
Indeed, Trump will shape the U.S. Supreme Court for decades. Presumably this
Saturday, it will be decided whether Judge Brett Kavanaugh will be appointed Justice
at the court despite serious sexual abuse allegations. His possible appointment
is explosive for several reasons. For one, it shows that there is still no fair arena
for women’s speech. The credibility of the psychology professor Christine Blasey
Ford, who spoke out publicly against Kavanaugh in a testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, is attacked by senate republicans; now Trump himself
unbearably mocked her at a political rally. Moreover, Kavanaugh’s likely appointment
as next member of the Supreme Court and the considerable protest it sparks shows
how deeply the U.S. society is divided, how hardened the camps are between Trump
supporters and opponents.
Politically, there is a lot at stake: Kavanaugh would solidify the conservative majority
on the Court for many years. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement earlier this
year gave the influential alliance of legal organizations, think tanks, and donors
from the conservatives a long awaited chance to bring a majority of the Supreme
Court in line with their ideological views. It will affect issues ranging from women’s
reproductive rights to LGBTQI rights; the Guardian calls the second Supreme Court
pick for Trump after Neil Gorsuch the ‘liberals’ worst nightmare’. On the basis of
a comparative view to the respective legal framework of Germany (i.e. the legal
framework for becoming Justice at the highest court), this contribution criticizes the
applicable constitutional requirements under the U.S. Constitution to be appointed
as Supreme Court Justice. Namely, it is criticized that in the U.S. only a simple
majority vote by the Senate is required to confirm or reject the president’s nominee
that potentially becomes Justice for a lifetime. It is shown that the German system
contributes to judicial independence and that only moderate candidates are eligible
for an election that requires a two-third majority of votes.
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Nomination by the U.S. President vs. Nomination
by different bodies of the German Bundestag and
Bundesrat
In the U.S., the “Appointments Clause” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2) states
that the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of the supreme Court.” Hence, to receive
appointment for the court, a candidate must first be nominated by the president and
then confirmed by the Senate. The precise criteria used in selecting a Supreme
Court nominee vary from president to president; in almost all cases it is about their
professional qualification as well as their political stance. In other words, presidents
nominate justices who will likely decide cases consistent with the president’s political
preferences. Depending on how many vacancies occur at the Supreme Court
during their office period, a president may have a significant influence on the filling
of several of these important posts. Indeed, after nomination by the president,
candidates must face a series of hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee
which may vote to send the nomination to the full U.S. Senate. However, it is rare for
the nominated candidate to be rejected later on.
The German constitutional system stipulates that the right to nominate candidates
for the Office of Justices at the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) lies with different
bodies, hence balances the power. Article 94 of the Basic Law stipulates that
the 16 FFC Justices, eight in each of the two senates, shall be appointed by the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat (half each). For the procedure in the Bundestag, the
German Parliament, (section 6 of the Act of the Federal Constitutional Court), the
so-called Election Committee (Wahlausschuss) has the right to propose candidates.
The Election Committee is appointed at the beginning of each election period and
consists of twelve members of the Bundestag, who are elected on proposal of the
parliamentary groups according to the rules of proportional representation. If at
least eight votes of the members of the Election Committee fall on one candidate,
he or she is proposed to the plenum of the Bundestag for election. In the election
procedure of the Bundesrat, the Federal Council, (section 7 of the Act of the Federal
Constitutional Court), the Justices are elected after a resolution proposal of a special
commission (Findungskommission). In practice, it has become established that the
different parties, SPD, CDU/CSU and Greens can alternately submit a proposal (the
Green have the right for every fifth proposal, SPD and CDU/CSU take turns every
appointment).
Simple majority in the U.S. Senate vs. two-third
majority in Bundestag and Bundesrat
As stipulated under the Appointments Clause, it is the constitutional responsibility
of the U.S. Senate to provide “advice and consent” to the president. Indeed, it is
common practice for presidents to consult with Senate party leaders as members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee before choosing a nominee. However, constitutional
scholars have differed as to how much relevance the word “advice” has. Historically,
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the degree to which Senate advice has been sought or used has varied, depending
on the president. As pointed out, it rarely happened that candidates got rejected
by the Senate, which is unsurprising considering that a simple majority vote of
the full Senate is sufficient to confirm or reject the nominee. Hence, Democrats or
Republicans can usually confirm their candidate alone without each other’s approval.
Confirmation by the Senate allows the president to formally appoint the candidate
to the court. The respective requirements under the German legal framework,
however, are more demanding. In both, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, a two-
thirds majority of votes is required to confirm the proposed candidate. Thus, it is
almost impossible for one political camp alone to appoint a candidate.
Lifetime appointment in the U.S. vs. 12 years of
service at the FCC
Under the U.S. Constitution, Justices on the Supreme Court are appointed for
lifetime. It is argued that this rule helps to ensure the court’s independence from the
president and Congress. However, as current events show, it also means that one
presidency can determine the country’s political agenda for decades. In Germany, to
the contrary, Justices are elected for a term of twelve years. Unlike in the U.S., there
is a maximum age limit of 68 years. To ensure their independence, the re-election
of sitting Justices is not possible (section 4 of the Act of the Federal Constitutional
Court).
Conclusion
The German appointment system of FCC justices is also under criticism, especially
due to controversies about the distribution of the votes for individual parties. In
principle, however, the FCC enjoys a high reputation which is not least because it
is considered distant from politics. Individual members of the court are difficult to
assign to political camps. In the U.S., however, the Supreme Court became part of
Trump’s “rule of law-nightmare” that has affected the whole country, institution by
institution. As illustrated by the two examples of Trump’s picks – current Supreme
Court Justice Neil Gorsuch and nominee Kavanaugh – show that the political agenda
of the candidates became so obvious that it is hard to still believe in their integrity
and impartiality. Kavanaugh himself described the sexual abuse allegations against
him as "a calculated and orchestrated political hit by Democrats”, thereby losing the
neutrality required by the office and revealing the lack of a, what lawyers call, 'judicial
temperament'.
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